

**INTERROGATING HEROICS OF NIGERIAN CIVIL WAR
IN ACHEBE'S *THERE WAS A COUNTRY* AND ADICHIE'S
*HALF OF A YELLOW SUN: A NEW-HISTORICIST
APPROACH***

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Abstract

The inciting narratives of the Biafran Civil War (1967–1970) likely provoke a case for the agitation for the actualisation of the Sovereign State of Biafra. The people of the defunct Biafra, mostly the Igbo, interpret the Federal Government's 'No Victor, No Vanquished' proclamation as illusory. The result is the sustained quest for the liberation of Biafra through confrontations, with some calling for another civil war. This work, while analyzing the situation, observes that there were flaws in the war which would make its repeating tragic. It uses Achebe's *There Was a Country* and Adichie's *Half of a Yellow Sun* as primary texts. The data was further collated from works rendered by scholars with divergent views. The study is foregrounded on New Historicism. There is a conscious effort to deconstruct violent revolutionary approaches in the agitation, and state that the Igbo should rather explore the Biafran War innovations using their cultural resilience to make the South-East Region Nigeria's commercial and technological hub. The research makes case for the intellectual re-birth of Biafra for scientific innovations and self-discoveries rather than a platform for another civil war.

Keywords: Biafra, New Historicism, Revolutionary, Cultural Resilience, Innovations

Introduction

The Biafran War (1967-1970) has generated many literary works in Nigeria. Writers “used the conflicts as source of materials for creative literature” (Nwahunanya, 1996, p. 1). Writers from the Igbo extraction, such as Achebe and Adichie, view the war from the perspectives of a race being subjugated in Nigeria because of the colouration of the January 15, 1966 coup, as Igbo. They base their arguments on the failure of the people of the South-East region, who constituted a major part of the defunct Biafra, to occupy key leadership positions at the Federal level since after the war.

Those from South-South, such as Amadi, view the war as oppressed people liberated from the Igbo oppression. Amadi (1973) writes that the Igbo settled in the South-South region many years ago “to dominate the smaller tribes” (p. 21). On the Federal side, Obasanjo (1980) captures the war as “a clean and honourable” fight to unify Nigeria (p. 167). Faruk (2011) justifies the killings of the Igbo as “reprisals for the death of Northern leaders as a result of the Ifeajuna/Nzeogwu coup” (p. 31). Contemporary writers, such as Okoye and Onuoha, recollect their personal war experiences as teens, and partly champion the rebirth of Biafra. Themes of the Biafran War narratives include the Igbo marginalisation, and the agitation for the Sovereign State of Biafra.

Nigeria is a victim of a forced merger following the amalgamation of Southern and Northern Protectorates on January 1, 1914. Her post-independence witnessed her citizens being more ethnically inclined. This became evident with the promulgation of the Richard Constitution of 1945, which laid the foundation for regionalism. The 1959 Federal elections, meant to usher in Nigeria’s Independence, “were embroiled in crises” (Obasanjo, 1980, p. 3). The crisis within the Action Group in 1962 topped it. It led to the detention of its leader, Chief Obafemi Awolowo, and his imprisonment in 1963. There were also the census crisis of 1962;

the Tiv riot of 1962–1965, and the flawed 1964 Federal elections. The Western Regional Election of 1965 was characterised by irregularities, leading to the breakdown of law and order. Ademoyega (1981) submits that the “Sardauna/Balewa administration was aimless and helpless” (p. 65).

According to Uwechue (1971), “Prolonged political disturbances were climaxed by a bloody coup d’etat” of January 15, 1966 (p. 5). It was “organized by mostly young Igbo military officers, and those killed, including Prime Minister Sir Tafawa Balewa, were mainly from the North” (Amadi, 1973, p. 8). The composition of the coupists informed the designation of the coup as Igbo.

To curtail the breakdown of law and order, the military, under Gen Thomas Aguiyi-Ironsi, was “formally invited by the civilian government to take over the administration of the country”; and Ironsi’s promulgation of Decree No. 34 pitched his government against the North (Uwechue, 1971, pp. 5-6). Ironsi also “could not decide whether to treat them (coup plotters) as heroes of the ‘revolution’ or send them before a martial as mutineers or murderers” (Obasanjo, 1980, p. 6). The period was characterised by anti-Igbo riots across the North, leading to their massacre and looting of their property. Ironsi was later killed on July 29, 1966.

Lt Col Yakubu Gowon assumed office as Head of State on 1 August, 1966. Brigadier Babafemi Ogundikpe, the highest ranking officer, was not allowed to take up the position by some privileged elements in power. Col Emeka Ojukwu, Governor of the Eastern Region, kicked against it, and later “refused to accept or recognise Gowon as the new Supreme Commander” (Akpa, 2019, p. 44). The ensuing imbroglio, among others, prompted a meeting of the Supreme Military Council at Aburi, Ghana. The resolutions at the meeting became subjects of interpretations as various sections gave varying meanings to the resolution. Schwarz writes in Obasanjo (1980) that it “was only Ojukwu who understood the real issues” (p. 10).

The build-up to the declaration of Biafra commenced on 27th May, 1967 when Col Ojukwu was “mandated by the Consultative Assembly” and “by the desires of the people” of the Eastern Region to secede from Nigeria (Achebe, 2012, p. 91). Uwechue (1971) writes that the creation of Biafra was “authorised by all Biafrans” (p. 51). Biafra existed from 1967 to 1970. The natives were people of the old Eastern Region, comprising today’s South-East and South-South. Biafra was led by Gen Ojukwu. Ojukwu handed over powers to his Deputy, Gen Phillip Effiong (1970-1970), before going on exile in Ivory Coast, marking the end of Biafra. Gowon declared the war as ‘No Victor, No Vanquished’. The Igbo, since the end of the war, seem aggrieved as they claim they are being marginalised in Nigeria’s polity. Akpa (2019) sums that “the deafening echoes of the agitation for the same Biafra should ... tell those [who] take pride in being avatars of inglorious history to reflect again” (p. 42).

One of the agitation groups for the rebirth of Biafra is the Movement for the Actualization of the Sovereign State of Biafra (MASSOB), which emerged in 1999, and founded by Chief Ralph Uwazulike, a lawyer. The second group is the Nnamdi Kanu-led Indigenous People of Biafra. Kanu was arrested in Kenya in July 2021, and is being tried in Nigeria. His arrest, according to his special counsel, Barr Aloy Ejimakor, violates international laws because Kanu travelled to Kenya as a Briton. Ejimakor asserts that the manner Kanu was arrested amounts to an “extraordinary rendition” (Ejimakor, 2021).

The above overview explains the genesis of the civil war, how the war ended as well as the dilemma of exclusion that the Igbo have allegedly found themselves in since then. This dilemma makes the Igbo continue to nurse the pains of the war.

Understanding Civil War Heroics: A Review of the Term

Heroics are actions that involve courage and determination. The attributes are always ennobled, extra-ordinary and elevated. Characters that have these attributes are regarded as heroes and

heroines (the latter referring to females). They therefore mean human beings with unique qualities.

Littel (2008) categorises heroes into traditional, cultural and modern heroes. He submits that “a traditional hero possesses good qualities that enable him or her to triumph over an antagonist who is bad or evil in some way” while a cultural hero “represents the values of his or her culture” (p. 111). For modern heroes, Littel (2008) writes that, “they tend to be individuals whose actions and decisions reflect personal courage. The conflicts they face are not on an epic scale, but involve moral dilemmas presented in the course of living. Such heroes are often in a struggle with established authorities because their actions challenge accepted beliefs” (p. 111).

There are also tragic heroes. These are heroes whose flaws lead to their downfall. Such flaws could be pride, weakness, and inordinate ambitions as portrayed in *Macbeth*, or poor judgment (Littel, 2008). They usually recognise their errors and consequences when it is too late to salvage. On the hand, classical heroes are ancient and historic. The likes of Odysseus, Oedipus and Achilles fall into this category. Generally, both modern and classical heroes put the welfare of others ahead of themselves. A major difference between the two is the fact that ancient heroes are more glorified. Their attributes are nonetheless often exaggerated, making them beyond humans (Akwanya, 1998).

There is however a classification within the classical definition of heroes, even though they overlap to some extent. The difference is in the means. Akwanya states that, “while the character in the historical drama attains the status of a tragic hero from his courage in the face of a cruel destiny, ancient Greek tragic characters are persons who are celebrated in that they have somehow survived death” (1998, p. 19).

According to Littel (2008), modern heroics differ or deviate from the concept of heroics in the ancient Greek or from the perspectives of the classical period. Modern heroics include noble and sacrificial actions of both the high and the low. The low in this aspect include some characters and actions that can better be

regarded as not noble. They are not aristocrats. They are among the group that is not accorded due recognition in society. They are recognised by critically reviewing their actions, although inconsequential when compared to heroes of the classical era.

Pertaining to the Nigerian Civil War, the age-long definitions of heroics include deeds of characters who overcame impossible obstacles in the defence of Biafra. They also include the unrecognised people who believe in the ideology of the war from the point of view of solidarity. A majority of them died, some were maimed or lost their identities in the build-up, during and after the war. They epitomise courage, determination and resilience. In addition, they exhibit sacrificial attributes in the service of their people. Some of these categories are captured in Achebe's *There Was a Country* and Adichie's *Half of a Yellow Sun*.

Deconstructing Heroics of Biafran War in Achebe's *There Was a Country* and Adichie's *Half of a Yellow Sun*

Synchronizing *There Was a Country* and *Half of a Yellow Sun* by Achebe and Adichie, respectively, this paper interrogates their various themes with regards to the heroics of the Biafran War. Both share ideological semblances about the war because of their common Igbo background. Thus, questioning their views in what Whitla calls 'dialectic' is novel because it will bring new ideas into the Nigerian Civil War literature, and will eventually enthrone a new understanding of what transpired, hoping to bring about a better national cohesion.

One of the interrogations is whether Christopher Okigbo's death in the battlefield as captured in Achebe's *There Was a Country* is his flaw. By implication, a tragic flaw implies a character's action or inaction that deservedly leads to his downfall. Okigbo and Achebe were literary contemporaries. Both intellectually sought solutions to avert the war when it was looming. When it eventually broke out, they switched their allegiance to Biafra. Okigbo's over-reactive impulses prompted his joining the Biafran Army. Achebe (2012) writes that, "when Okigbo decided to join the army he went great lengths to conceal

his intention from me, for fear, no doubt that I might attempt to dissuade him” (p. 117). Okigbo’s concealing his decision to join the army is an indication that his choice caused his death.

Ali Mazrui’s assertion captures this. According to him, “the Nigerian Civil War and all its ramified implications [can be] compressed in the single poetic tragedy of the death of Christopher Okigbo ...” (quoted in Achebe, 2012, p. 56). Okigbo can be argued as a patriot because, unlike Achebe and other Igbo intellectuals, he took up arms with the rank of a Major, and went physically to the battlefield. However, his decision is an act of miscalculation. His joining the Biafran Army, according to Achebe, brought to eight the number of jobs he held within a short period of his spell in life: “[Okigbo] rapidly ran up a list of jobs that read like a manual of careers: civil servant, businessman, teacher, librarian, publisher, industrialist, and soldier” (2012, p. 115). His intimacy with Major Chukwuma Kaduna Nzeogwu intoxicated him. Okigbo’s death was announced with that of Nzeogwu, implying that they could have been killed at the same time.

Okeoma in Adichie’s *Half of a Yellow Sun* shares the same flaw. Okeoma was among the lecturers at the University of Nigeria, Nsukka, discussing Nigeria’s politics before the war. They tried to proffer solutions. However, he became a Biafran commando when his pen could not endure his pains, thus trading his intellectualism. Okeoma was on a condolence visit to the Odenigbo’s on the death of their mother, and was described as having lost touch with his flair for poetry. He was asked to demonstrate his art of poetry, but, according to Adichie, he “sounded different” (2006, p. 324). Okeoma’s decision to join the army does not portray him as a hero. Some of his UNN scholars joined the Biafran Science Group where their competencies would be maximally felt.

Okeoma’s sternness in the course of the war is more of overzealousness than the mastery of the art. For instance, he blames his commander, a white mercenary, for Biafra’s loss of Enugu to the Nigerian forces. Adichie (2006) quotes him as saying: “why should white people be paid to fight our war

anyway?... We are willing to give ourselves for Biafra” (p. 323). He is a neophyte, and his overbearing stems from his failure to differentiate between military warfare and academics.

Another tragic flaw is the composition and execution of the January 15, 1966 coup. Whatever their goals were remains immaterial because they failed to aggregate the political dimensions that their act eventually took. The news about the coup was initially received with enthusiasm. Achebe (2012) writes that, “there was an initial period of spontaneous, overt jubilation” (p. 66). This underscores the fact that the coup was seen as a solution to the nation’s quagmire. In another discourse, Achebe (2012) states that, “a second story got around that the military coup ... was in fact a sinister plot by the ambitious Igbos (sic) of the East to seize control of Nigeria” (p. 66). This interpretation followed the sectional killings during the coup which cast suspicions on the mission of the plotters. The fact that the core plotters were mainly the Igbo is another flaw. This belief is affirmed by the killing of the Prime Minister, and the Premier of Northern Region. Hence the later assumption that it was an ethnic plot to take over the country was obvious. Achebe (2012) writes, “but by killing Sir Ahmadu Bello, Nzeogwu and the other coup plotters had put themselves on a collision course...” (p. 79).

Many reasons have been adduced to justify this. That Zik travelled outside the country and that MI Okpara, the Premier of Eastern Region, was playing host to a top official on a state visit from Cyprus cannot be enough. It can only be justified that they were strategically excluded. The consequence of these flaws links the Nigerian Civil War to a breach on founding laws of human society and the inability to change or escape the consequences of breaching them, the end being the state of “desirable composure” (Akwanya, 1998, p. 12). This justifies the countercoup by the Northern elements.

In Adichie, the initial justification was that the coup would end corruption in the country. In any event, there must be beneficiaries; and in this scenario, the Igbo were not on the receiving end. Adichie (2006) states that, “the prime minister was

missing... the premiers of the North and West were missing” (p. 124). With the Premier of the Eastern Region and the President of the country, both Easterners, not missing, it was inevitable that Northerners would react. If the alleged corruption was the criterion for who should be killed, sparing Eastern political leaders makes it a human error because they were not exonerated from the act.

Among those that celebrated the coup were Okeoma and other academic staff members of the University of Nigeria, Nsukka. One of the guests said, “this is the end of corruption! This is what we have needed to happen since that general strike” (Adichie, 2006, p. 125). For Okeoma, “those majors are true heroes!” (Adichie, 2006, p. 125). Adichie adds that, “there was excitement in their voices...” (2006, p. 125).

None of the Igbo intellectuals at the inception of the discussion at Odenigbo’s house justified why Igbo leaders were excluded from the corruption charges. This view only came to the fore when another guest remarked that there has been another interpretation from a foreign medium that the coup was targeted at the northerners. According to the source, “it was mostly Northerners who were killed” (Adichie, 2006, p. 125). Master and Professor Ezeka however opened another discourse that, “it was mostly Northerners who were in government” that were killed (Adichie, 2006, p. 125). Indeed, there were other non-Northerners in that government.

The other flaw is the ethnic makeup of the plotters of the January 15, 1966 coup. It was when the second military coup took place that the audience read about the feud between northern military officers and their Igbo counterparts. With the reprisals, Adichie creates a binary opposite between the soldiers, and in the process exposes that the first coup has been interpreted as an Igbo coup. Generally, it is a major tragic flaw for not applying equity in the build-up as well as the execution of the coup.

Then comes the Ojukwu propaganda. His reassurances gave false hopes to his faithful that all was well. It is indeed a soldier’s duty to defend his or her country, but that of Biafra was suicidal because it amounted to fighting an armed man with bare hands.

According to Achebe, many Biafran combatants believed that the secessionist Biafra was militarily equipped. He writes that Gen Effiong “quickly recruited an additional twenty thousand men and created a separate Biafran militia of civilian volunteers, who received on-the-spot training ...” (2012, p. 153). The question is: why embarking on a war ill-equipped? Achebe (2012) quotes Forsyth thus: “Biafran soldiers marched into war one man behind the other because they had only one rifle between them, and the thinking was that if one soldier was killed ... the other would pick up the only weapon available and continue fighting” (2012, pp. 153 -154). This suicidal ingenuity of Biafran soldiers is also corroborated by British journalist Richard West: “Biafra was the first place I had been to in Africa where the Africans themselves were truly in-charge” (Achebe, 2012, p. 172). It implies that it is only in Biafra that armless soldiers confront armed soldiers. The result, Achebe posits, is that, “the Biafrans were completely outgunned” (2012, p. 154).

Ojukwu’s assurances that he had stocked enough weapons in his armoury to sustain the war ironically gingered the spirits of his soldiers. Achebe (2012) agrees that, “the prevalent mantra was ... ‘Ojukwu give us guns to fight a war’” (p. 171). When the war mattered most, there was no such storage. This paper asserts that it is not in the heat of a war that experiments are carried out. The Ogbunigwe innovations, no doubt, contributed immensely in prosecuting the war, but it was suicidal to rely on such untested weapons to fight a war. That is why many operators of Ogbunigwe died while detonating it.

In *Half of a Yellow Sun*, Inatimi served under the dreaded Biafran Organisation of Freedom Fighters, BOFF. All his immediate family members were annihilated in the North, except him. As the last man standing, he volunteered to serve in the Biafran Army. Adichie (2006) quotes Inatimi as saying that, “when I lost my whole family, every single one, it was as if I had been born all over again ...” (p. 319). His preaching is not an attribute of patriotism. The truth is that he wants what befell him to be

transmitted to others, a kind of shared burden, which is capable of annihilating the entire Igbo race.

Adichie also uses Ugwu to portray the antithetical aspect of Ojukwu's inordinate ambition. When Ugwu returned after being wounded in the war front, he began to interrogate the war project. One of his objectives to join the military was to use Ogbunigwe to fight the Federal forces as a result of the image of horror he had acquired about the dreaded object. But, according to Adichie, contrary to his perception of what Prof Ekwenu had described Ogbunigwe to be, Ugwu "stared at what was before him: a dull metal container full of scrap metal" (2006, p. 359). This, among other first-hand experiences, formed Ugwu's disenchantment towards Ojukwu. Adichie writes that when Ojukwu wanted to address the nation on radio, Ugwu would respond, "please turn that thing off..." (2006, p. 399).

The tragic fate of Biafran soldiers is also evident on how they were ill-trained and ill-equipped before being mobilised to the battlefield. They wielded toys as guns. Adichie (2006) writes that soldiers manning a checkpoint "were holding a long piece of wood carefully carved to look like a rifle" (p. 180). The newly-conscripted ones were being "trained using sticks" (Adichie, 2006, p. 199). They also lacked motivation. This informed why they were escaping from duty posts. Like Harrison, they soaked cloths in "fresh beet water" and tied them "in bandage" and then claim to be "survivor of air raid" (Adichie, 2006, p. 303).

There are also arguments that the youthful exuberances of Biafra's Head of State, Gen Emeka Ojukwu, prolonged the war. At a certain stage, some Biafran elders considered the absurdity of continuing with the war as a result of its devastating consequences. Moves to decide on discontinuing the war were said to have been frustrated in most cases by Ojukwu. Achebe (2012) writes that Ojukwu's "tendency to be independent often brought disagreements" between him and some key members of the Biafran hierarchy. A majority of them, writes Achebe, "were averse to Ojukwu's trait of reservation and acting without consultation" (2012, p. 119). He therefore affirms that, "Ojukwu's

background and temperament, for good or ill, influenced the decisions and choices that he made throughout the crisis” (2012, p. 120). Ojukwu’s unyielding stance “forced Zik out of Biafra” (Achebe, 2012, p. 216).

In *Half of a Yellow Sun*, Ojukwu’s errors are also identified among the factors that prolonged the war. Even though Kainene had “Vigilance” (Adichie, 2006, p. 345) inscribed as her plate number, which was the name Ojukwu gave his Mercedes Benz, she reveals that the war is a result of Ojukwu’s personal ambition to be Head of State. She told Richard that she contributed money to the Biafran cause, but left a scene of a Biafran solidarity rally because she “won’t be held up in the hot sun just to help further Ojukwu’s ambition” (Adichie, 2006, p. 182). She refers to various gestures of the masses in supporting Biafra as “benign extortion” (Adichie, 2006, p. 182). The implication is that she is not in tune with the entire philosophy of the war, but simply follows the majority for the sake of solidarity.

One of the areas that ironically expose Ojukwu’s inordinate ambition is his claim that he had a stockpile of arms to prosecute the war. Kainene said, “Madu told me today that the army has nothing...” (Adiche, 2012, p. 183). Thus Ojukwu charismatically made things look normal when the opposite was the case. The same Kaninene accused Ojukwu of infighting and systematically dealing with some men and soldiers “whose wives he wants” (Adichie, 2012, p. 313). When Ojukwu was going on exile, many Biafrans still believed in his speech that he would return with a peace pact. This means that despite the difficulties Biafrans were passing through, they still believed in his propaganda.

The helplessness of the Nigerian intellectuals in averting the war at its inception is another tragic aspect of the war. Achebe reveals the common consciousness and collective commitment on the part of Nigerian intellectuals to reshape the history of Africans which was portrayed negatively by Europeans. Achebe (2012) writes that the goal of the pioneer African writers was to “oppose the negative discourse in some of the novels we encountered” (p. 55). “By ‘writing back’ to the West we were attempting to reshape

the dialogue between the colonized and the colonizer” (Achebe, 2012, p. 55). These intellectuals were also committed to finding an end to various crises that led to the war. They were from time to time in opposition to Nigerian politicians because they “had slowly transformed themselves into ... a notorious predator from the insect kingdom” (Achebe, 2012, p. 108). Their moments of tragedy began when their suggestions were jettisoned by the ruling but less educated class. Some of them, like Wole Soyinka, landed in prison for their efforts to avert the war. When the war became tribalised, the intellectuals became victims of the division. The massacre of the Igbo opened Achebe’s eyes that indeed he is the ‘other’ in the Nigerian polity. The emphasis here is the fact that the Nigerian unity is cracked from the foundation because despite the independence collectively won by people from different ethnic nationalities, the affiliations of individual Nigerians remain to their roots. Achebe (2012) writes, “I realised suddenly that I had not been living in my home; I had been living in a strange place” (2012, p. 68).

In Adichie, Odenigbo’s house at the UNN was the centre for discussing intellectual matters. Adichie (2006) states that, “the conversations no longer ended in reassuring laughter...” (p. 142). Some discussants like Master began to see the hero in Nzeogwu. He would utter, “if we had more men like Major Nzeogwu in this country, we would not be where we are today...!” (Adichie, 2006, p. 125). The shift in their discussions in support of the coup is a matter of lack of intellectual ideas. At the end of the war, they returned to the UNN and found out that things had fallen apart.

Aside the Igbo elite, the Biafran masses also had their own woes. The magnitude of what they passed through is of the type, according to Aristotle, that, “anybody merely hearing what is afoot will shudder with fear and pity as a result of what is happening” (*Art of Poetry*, Chapter 14). The prelude to the Biafran War was characterized by reprisals on Igbo people across the federation. This is a result of a perception that the January 1966 military coup was masterminded by Igbo military officers. The tragic flaw is that some of them that returned to the East for safety were persuaded

by the Eastern authorities to return to the North as a mark of peace. Most of the returnees met their death afterwards, thus becoming sacrificial lambs. The act of asking them to return to their bases in the North to demonstrate Nigeria's unity is in the least heroic.

Also, women were victims of deranged Biafran soldiers. The ones that involved Ugwu were the gang-raping of a female pub attendant and molesting a couple who drove past them. Adichie writes that Ugwu and his co-soldiers took turn to rape her, and "she was sobbing... while the soldiers were cheering" (2006, p. 365). On the part of the driver, a soldier slapped him, and he "staggered... and crashed to the ground" (Adichie, 2006, p. 363). Hunger also afflicted Biafran masses. It was so tense that virtually everybody became a victim of malnutrition. Adichie paints this picture through Harrison who made an analogy between human beings and goats. Harrison told Richard that, "hunger is bad, sah. Many people are watching the goats. .. To see what they are eating, and after seeing they are boiling the same leaves and giving their children to drink. It is stopping kwashiokor" (sic) (Adichie, 2006, p. 303).

The greatest tragedy of the Nigerian Civil War is the failure of governments and people of the defunct Republic and the larger Nigerians to consolidate the Biafran innovations. Achebe writes that the Biafran Research and Production unit developed rockets, bombs, and telecommunication gadgets, and devised an ingenious strategy to refine petroleum. They also invented Ogbunigwe, which "struck great terror in the hearts of many a Nigerian soldier, and were used to great effect by the Biafran army throughout the conflict" (Achebe, 2012, p. 156). Scientific innovations are the basis of development globally. They include innovations in war weapons, medicine, agriculture, education, culture and tourism. Biafrans sustained the later part of the war through ingenuities. These innovations include oil refining, which has eluded Nigeria. Nigeria imports arms to fight insurgency. Nigeria cannot also boost of food sufficiency. If it had imbibed the Biafran innovations, the notion of Nigeria being the giant of Africa would not be in vain.

Biafra also locally produced her war tanks, equivalent of today's armoured vehicles. Achebe writes that the tanks were a reinforcement of Range Rovers, and "by their third reincarnation, these armoured fighting vehicles, or AFVs, had become quite sophisticated, with rocket launchers added" (Achebe, 2012, p. 157).

Conclusion

This paper draws the attention of the Igbo to the dangers of another civil war in Nigeria. It posits that the war should rather be fought intellectually, by adopting the Biafran Civil War as a metaphor for development. The paper calls for a paradigm shift from the tragic rendering of the accounts of the war towards its positives. This approach will reduce the restiveness in the South East, caused by the agitation for the rebirth of Biafra and its consequences, including the Monday sit-at-home and inexplicable criminalities, which are currently crippling the economy of the people of the South East.

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