A CRITIQUE OF W.V.O. QUINE’S NATURALIZED EPISTEMOLOGY

Abstract

This paper is critical scrutiny of Quine’s naturalized epistemology in order to determine whether it is a viable epistemological theory. They dissect Quine’s naturalized epistemology with the philosophical tools of critical analysis and in the process discover that Quine’s naturalized epistemology reduces epistemology to a purely descriptive science, a mere chapter of psychology. Owing to this reduction, the paper argues that Quine’s naturalized epistemology purges epistemology of its distinctive feature as a normative science that is fundamentally concerned with the justification of human knowledge. And as a result of this, Quine’s naturalized epistemology lacks an epistemological status. In addition to this, the paper maintains that Quine’s attempt to reduce epistemology to psychology was not a successful project. This is evident in the fact that the major claim of Quine that “epistemology is a chapter in psychological†is not a psychological construct but a philosophical construct that cannot be derived from through the use of the descriptive and experimental methods of the empirical sciences. Base on this, the paper concludes that Quine’s naturalized epistemology cannot be a viable replacement of traditional epistemology.