A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE NON-JUSTICIABILITY CLAUSES OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF NIGERIA 1999 AND THE CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF INDIA

Abstract

The doctrine of non-justiciability reflects a constitutional design that limits judicial review in specific domains, particularly socio-economic rights and directive principles of state policy. This paper undertakes a comparative analysis of the non-justiciability clauses under the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 and the Constitution of the Republic of India. While both constitutions embody aspirational provisions that guide governance and social justice, they diverge in their approaches to enforceability. In Nigeria, Chapter II of the 1999 Constitution, which contains the Fundamental Objectives and Directive Principles of State Policy, is expressly declared non-justiciable under section 6(6)(c), thereby excluding courts from adjudicating on matters arising therefrom. Conversely, the Indian Constitution, under Part IV, similarly renders its Directive Principles of State Policy non-justiciable; yet, Indian jurisprudence has progressively evolved to harmonize these principles with justiciable fundamental rights, thereby expanding judicial enforcement of socio-economic entitlements. This study critically compares the textual provisions, judicial interpretations, and practical implications of these clauses in both jurisdictions. It argues that while Nigeria’s rigid stance forecloses judicial creativity in advancing social justice, India’s pragmatic jurisprudence demonstrates a functional reconciliation of non-justiciability with enforceable rights. The paper concludes that Nigeria can draw valuable lessons from India’s judicial activism to reinterpret or reform its constitutional framework, ensuring that socio-economic aspirations translate into enforceable rights; expanding the scope of human rights 
and the frontiers of constitutionalism without undermining the doctrine of separation of powers.