

INTERROGATING THE CAUSES AND MOTIVATIONS OF IPOB'S ARMED STRUGGLE IN MERIDIONAL NIGERIA 2012-2024

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CITATION: Nwafor, E.O. & Onyishi, A.E. (2025). Interrogating the causes and motivations of IPOB's armed struggle in meridional Nigeria 2012-2024, *UBS Journal of Business and Economic Policy*, 3(2), 1 - 22.

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Abstract

The intrinsic drivers of Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB) movement in Southeastern Nigeria are examined in this study through a mixed-methods approach. By combining the methods, the study integrates both contextual viewpoints and statistical analysis. Qualitative data were obtained via semi-structured interviews with stakeholders to comprehend their motivations and experiences. Quantitative data were gathered through structured surveys measuring public feelings concerning injustice and self-determination, utilizing a Likert scale for nuanced responses. The study, grounded in social identity theory, included a sample of 385 respondents, determined via Cochran's formula to ensure statistical validity. Data analysis combined thematic analysis with quantitative methods, employing the Karl Pearson's correlation coefficient and the modified student's t-test to assess correlations and significance. Findings indicate strong links between historical narratives, security dynamics, and ideological motivations. The study emphasizes the need for dialogue and community development to promote stability in Southeastern Nigeria

Key Words: IPOB armed struggle; High security presence, Intrinsic motivations, culture, Igbos

Introduction

The quest for Biafra's independence is rooted in Nigeria's colonial and post-colonial history. The Biafran War (1967-1970) resulted in widespread devastation and loss of life, with millions of civilians affected by famine and conflict. The war ended with Nigeria's territorial integrity intact, but the scars of that conflict lingered (Nwankwo, 2022). Post-war policies, economic marginalization, and political exclusion have contributed to a sense of disenfranchisement among the Igbo people, who primarily inhabit the South-eastern region. This historical backdrop sets the stage for the emergence of The Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB) as a response to perceived injustices (Eze, 2020). Understanding the causes and motivations behind IPOB's actions is crucial, not only for grasping the complexities of ethnic nationalism in Nigeria but also for addressing the broader implications of such movements in a multi-ethnic society. This study aims to interrogate the underlying factors that have propelled IPOB's armed struggle from its inception until 2024.

The IPOB armed struggle in South-Eastern Nigeria epitomizes the complex interplay of historical grievances, socio-economic disparities, and political marginalization that fuel

ethnic tensions in contemporary Nigeria. IPOB emerged as a significant socio-political movement in South-eastern Nigeria, particularly since its formal establishment in 2012 (Eze, 2020). The group's advocacy for the secession of Biafra from Nigeria has been marked by a blend of peaceful protests and, increasingly, armed struggle. Nigeria's transition to democratic governance in 1999 brought hope for a more inclusive political system; however, many ethnic groups continue to feel marginalized (Adeleke, 2021). The Igbo people, despite their significant contributions to Nigeria's economy and culture, have often found themselves on the fringes of the political discourse. The perceived neglect by successive governments has fueled resentment and demands for greater autonomy, culminating in the rise of movements such as IPOB (Okafor, 2023).

Nevertheless, economic disparities play a crucial role in fueling the discontent. The South-eastern region, despite its rich resources and entrepreneurial spirit, has faced significant economic challenges. High levels of unemployment, lack of infrastructure, and inadequate access to education and healthcare have perpetuated cycles of poverty (Uche, 2019). The feeling of being economically sidelined has heightened calls for independence and self-determination. IPOB's narrative often emphasizes these socioeconomic grievances, framing the struggle as not just a political issue but a fight for economic justice (Eze, 2020). Cultural identity is another vital aspect that underpins IPOB's motivations. The Igbo people have a rich cultural heritage, and the movement seeks to revive and promote this identity in the face of perceived assimilation into a dominant Nigerian culture. IPOB's advocacy for Biafran independence is deeply intertwined with cultural resurgence, as members view the struggle as a way to reclaim their identity and assert their rights as a distinct people (Nwankwo, 2022). The movement's emphasis on cultural pride resonates with many, particularly the youth, who are increasingly disillusioned with the status quo (Uche, 2019).

This local struggle resonates with global movements, such as the Kurds in the Middle East (Gunter, 2019), and the Catalans in Spain (Royo, 2021), pursuing self-determination against oppressive state structures. These movements frequently arise from historical contexts characterized by colonial legacies and exclusionary governance practices. The quest for autonomy or independence is often rooted in a collective memory of past injustices and a desire for recognition and rights (Smith, 2020). For instance, the Kurdish struggle for autonomy has been marked by similar themes of ethnic identity and historical grievances against state repression (Gunter, 2019). The current political climate in Nigeria exacerbates the IPOB conflict. In other words, the widespread belief in systemic injustice in Nigeria – characterized by rampant corruption, poor governance, and the neglect of the Southeastern region – intensifies public discontent. The violent crackdowns on IPOB activities, including military interventions and arrests, reflect a broader pattern observed in various conflicts, where state responses to dissent often escalate rather than mitigate violence (Okwudili, 2022). For instance, similar state repression has been observed in the cases of the Catalan independence movement in Spain, where government actions against protestors have led to heightened tensions and international scrutiny (Royo, 2021). These developments are rapidly spread due to social media and their information technologies.

In recent years, technology and social media have played a transformative role in mobilizing support for IPOB. The movement has effectively utilized platforms like Twitter, Facebook, and WhatsApp to spread its message and garner international attention (Adeleke, 2021). This digital activism has empowered younger generations, making them more aware of their rights and the injustices faced by their communities. The ability to share information rapidly helped to build a sense of solidarity among supporters, both within Nigeria and in the diaspora (Eze, 2020; Okafor, 2023). Additionally, the role of the Nigerian diaspora is significant, as many expatriates actively support the movement through funding, advocacy, and awareness campaigns (Nwankwo, 2022). The international community's attention to human rights issues in Nigeria also brought IPOB's plight to the forefront, influencing its strategies and objectives (Uche, 2019).

The shift towards armed struggle marks a critical juncture in IPOB's trajectory. Initially founded as a non-violent movement, the increasing frustration with the Nigerian government's response to peaceful protests has led some factions to adopt more militant approaches (Eze, 2020). This transition raises complex ethical and strategic questions about the effectiveness and consequences of armed struggle. While it may draw attention to the cause, it also risks alienating potential supporters and inciting further violence, complicating the landscape of resistance (Okafor, 2023). The social identity theories of ethnic conflict no doubt reflect the motivations of IPOB's armed struggle as its basic tenets elucidates how economic disparities and identity politics shape group dynamics and collective action both locally and globally (Harris, 2019; Tajfel & Turner, 1986; Adeleke, 2021). Additionally, a critical examination of power relations and historical grievances will provide insights into the motivations driving IPOB's actions. By integrating these theoretical perspectives, the study aims to present a nuanced understanding of the IPOB phenomenon.

The background to this study reveals a complex interplay of historical, political, socioeconomic, and cultural factors that have contributed to the emergence of IPOB and its armed struggle. Understanding these dynamics is essential for comprehending the broader implications of ethnic nationalism in Nigeria and beyond. As this study seeks to interrogate the causes and motivations of IPOB's actions from 2012 to 2024, it aims to contribute valuable insights into the current discourse surrounding self-determination, identity, and resistance within a multi-ethnic society. By addressing these critical issues, the research hopes to inform policymakers, scholars, and stakeholders about the underlying grievances that continue to shape the aspirations of the Igbo people and the future of Nigeria.

Literature Review

IPOB Armed Struggle

The state of the literature

Several empirical studies have highlighted the socio-economic factors contributing to the emergence and support for the IPOB movement. For instance, Okafor and Eze (2017) conducted a survey in Southeastern Nigeria to investigate the relationship between unemployment rates and youth participation in IPOB activities. Their findings revealed

that high unemployment levels significantly correlated with increased support for the movement among young people. The study concluded that economic disenfranchisement, particularly among the youth, plays a crucial role in mobilizing support for IPOB's agenda. In another study, Nwankwo (2016) focused on the socio-economic conditions in the Southeast region, emphasizing how poverty and lack of access to basic services fuel discontent. Nwankwo conducted interviews with local residents and found that many perceived IPOB as a voice for their grievances against systemic neglect by the Nigerian government. Participants articulated feelings of marginalization and expressed hope that IPOB could bring about positive change in their socio-economic conditions. This study underscores the importance of addressing socio-economic disparities to understand the motivations behind the IPOB armed struggle. Recent studies have further illuminated the socio-economic conditions that fuel support for IPOB. For instance, Nwodo and Eze (2020) conducted a quantitative analysis examining the relationship between economic disenfranchisement and support for secessionist movements in the Southeast. Their findings indicated that individuals facing higher levels of poverty and unemployment were significantly more likely to support IPOB's agenda. This study reinforces previous research indicating that socio-economic grievances are pivotal in mobilizing support for the movement.

On the other hand, Akinwunmi (2018) explored the political marginalization of the Igbo people and its implications for the IPOB conflict. Through qualitative interviews with political analysts and local leaders, the study found that many Igbos feel excluded from national governance, leading to a sense of political alienation. In addition, Ezeani (2015) examined the role of political leadership within IPOB. Using a mixed-methods approach, Ezeani analyzed the influence of Nnamdi Kanu, the leader of IPOB, on mobilizing support for the movement. The study revealed that Kanu's charismatic leadership and ability to articulate the Igbo plight resonated deeply with supporters. His rhetoric often emphasized themes of historical injustice and the need for self-determination, which helped galvanize widespread support for IPOB's objectives. In more recent studies Okeke (2022) examined the responses of the Nigerian government to IPOB activism, focusing on both repression and dialogue. The study highlights a dual approach: while the government has employed military force to suppress dissent, there have also been attempts at negotiation. However, the lack of genuine political engagement and the persistence of heavy-handed tactics have fostered further resentment among IPOB supporters, complicating the potential for peaceful resolution.

In some earlier empirical studies, the role of identity and cultural factors in the IPOB armed struggle has also been a focus in recent times. Ibeanu (2018) for instance, explored how cultural identity influences support for IPOB among the Igbo people. Through ethnographic methods, the study revealed that many supporters view IPOB as a vehicle for expressing and preserving their cultural heritage. The emphasis on Igbo identity and history is often intertwined with the movement's objectives, providing a strong motivational force for participants. Additionally, Nnamani (2017) examined the narratives surrounding the IPOB movement in media and public discourse. The study analyzed how media representations of IPOB have shaped public perceptions and influenced support. Nnamani found that while some media outlets portrayed IPOB as a

legitimate expression of cultural identity, others framed it as a radical group, which affected public sentiment. This research highlights the importance of understanding the narratives surrounding IPOB and their implications for community support.

Youth involvement in IPOB has been a critical area of study, given that young people represent a significant portion of its support base. Uche (2016) conducted a survey focusing on the motivations of youth participants in IPOB activities. The research found that few young supporters were driven by a desire for social change and a sense of agency in addressing their grievances; most of them are not sure of what is right or wrong. Uche's findings suggest that some youth view IPOB as a means to challenge the status quo and demand recognition from the Nigerian state while others desire peaceful coexistence. Furthermore, Okeke (2015) explored the role of social media in mobilizing youth support for IPOB. The study highlighted how platforms like Facebook and Twitter have facilitated the dissemination of IPOB's messages and allowed for common purpose within the organization. Okeke argued that social media serves as a vital tool for political mobilization, enabling young people to connect and engage with the movement in unprecedented ways. Additionally, Ifeyinwa (2022) also explored the impact of social media on youth activism within IPOB. The research found that platforms such as Whatsapp, Twitter and Facebook have become essential tools for organizing protests and disseminating information. Social media not only facilitates communication among supporters but also helps amplify their grievances to a broader audience. This study highlights the importance of digital activism in modern movements and its implications for traditional forms of political engagement.

Also Amnesty International (2017) reported on human rights violations linked to the Nigerian government's response to IPOB activities. The report highlighted incidents of extrajudicial killings, arbitrary detentions, and other abuses committed by state security forces against IPOB members. These findings emphasize the need for accountability and protection of human rights in the context of the conflict, as such violations not only exacerbate grievances but also undermine prospects for peace. In a qualitative study, Nwafor (2018) examined the experiences of IPOB members who faced state repression. Through interviews, the research revealed the psychological and social impacts of such repression, including trauma and stigma. Nwafor argued that addressing these human rights abuses is essential for healing and reconciliation within affected communities.

Theoretical Framework

The IPOB conflict in Southeastern Nigeria can be analyzed through several theoretical frameworks that provide insights into the complex dynamics at play. Theories of political economy, social identity, and conflict can elucidate how economic disparities and identity politics shape group dynamics and collective action both locally and globally (Harris, 2019; Tajfel & Turner, 1986). But the social identity theory (SIT)'s centrality on ethnic identity movement, in-group dynamics, and processes of social categorization and social comparison, which are pivotal in the IPOB context makes it the most suited theory for the study. Hence, the SIT is employed for this study. The SIT was developed by Henri Tajfel and John Turner in the 1970s for understanding how individuals identify with social groups and how this identification influences behavior and attitudes. This theory

is particularly relevant to the IPOB conflicts in Southeastern Nigeria, where ethnic identity plays a crucial role in the movement for self-determination. One of the basic tenets of the theory posits that individuals derive a significant part of their identity from their membership in social groups, which can lead to in-group favoritism and out-group discrimination (Tajfel & Turner, 1986). In the context of the IPOB, the Igbo identity is central to the movement's narrative. The historical trauma of the Biafran War and the subsequent marginalization of the Igbo people have reinforced a collective identity that is both distinct and politically charged.

Social categorization is the first step in social identity theory, where individuals classify themselves and others into various social groups based on characteristics such as ethnicity, nationality, and culture (Davis, Love, & Fares, 2019; Williams-Gualandi, 2020). This process allows individuals to navigate complex social environments by simplifying their interactions. In the context of IPOB, the categorization of the Igbo ethnic group as distinct from other Nigerian ethnic groups is fundamental. The historical context of the Biafran War (1967-1970) has reinforced this categorization. The war, characterized by severe humanitarian crises, deepened ethnic divisions and solidified the Igbo identity in opposition to the Nigerian state (Idam & Emeh 2022). The collective memory of suffering during the war fosters a strong sense of belonging among the Igbo, which is crucial for mobilizing support for IPOB. By categorizing themselves as Igbo, individuals align with a shared history of oppression and a common goal of self-determination, enhancing group solidarity (Nwankwo, 2021).

Once individuals categorize themselves, social identity theory posits that they engage in social comparison, assessing their group (in-group) against others (out-groups). This comparison often leads to in-group favoritism, where individuals develop a positive bias towards their group while perceiving out-groups negatively. In the case of IPOB, this dynamic is evident in the relationship between the Igbo and the Nigerian government. The perception of systemic marginalization and discrimination against the Igbo fosters a narrative of victimization. IPOB frames its struggle as one against an oppressive state that has historically marginalized the Igbo people. This narrative not only reinforces in-group solidarity but also justifies the movement's actions, including protests and armed resistance. The social comparison process enhances the sense of injustice felt by IPOB members, motivating them to advocate for Biafran sovereignty as a remedy for perceived grievances (Obi, 2023).

Methodology

The study employed a mixed-methods approach, combining qualitative and quantitative research methods to provide a comprehensive understanding of the intrinsic drivers of the IPOB conflict. This methodology allows for rich, contextual insights while also enabling statistical analysis of broader trends as was demonstrated in the data analysis section. In the qualitative aspect of the research, the study ethnographically focused on understanding participants' lived experiences, beliefs, and motivations through 'Semi-Structured Interviews' with open-ended questions focused on intrinsic motivations. We interviewed 12 stakeholders, 2 persons from each state in addition to 2 traditional leaders who were purposively selected to ensure diverse perspectives and attain thematic

saturation. Data were collected through ethnographic methods from the respondents. After being informed that their answers would only be used for research and not for any other purpose, the interviewees voluntarily took part in the study. The researcher pledged to use pseudonyms in place of their own names. In this sense, each interviewee in the study will be represented by a code (WP – willing participant). The goal of sorting through the interviewees' responses was to identify the recurring themes. It is important to note that throughout the fieldwork, the researcher adhered to all ethical standards for conducting interviews.

On the quantitative Data Collection aspect the study employed a 'Survey' we designed a structured questionnaire to measure public sentiment towards IPOB, feelings of injustice, and beliefs about self-determination. Likert-scale items were included for measuring attitudes and perceptions, as well as demographic questions for contextual analysis. The Likert style questionnaire scaling displayed different weight for each of the options that appeared in the research instrument, it ranged from: Strongly Agreed (SA) =5, Agreed (A) =4, Undecided (U) = 3, Disagree (D) =2, strongly disagreed (SD) =1. Each question is divided up above to allow respondents the freedom to choose among alternative answers provided in the structured questionnaire which was distributed online and in person. To validate the instruments, experts in the specific study field were called upon to assess whether or not the instrument reflects the known content area since we employed content validity for the study. However, to obtain the reliability of the instrument the test-retest method was applied. The test was conducted on selected participants of the population under study and the difference obtained from the two sets of test determined the strength of the correlation, thereby determining whether to continue or not.

The area of the study concentrates on the socio-political landscape of Southeastern Nigeria. The region, predominantly inhabited by the Igbo ethnic group, is characterized by a complex interplay of historical, cultural, and political factors that have significantly shaped its contemporary dynamics. The geopolitical boundaries of this study encompass the five southeastern states of Nigeria: Abia, Anambra, Ebonyi, Enugu, and Imo with a population of approximately 23,488,500 in 2022 as projected by Nigeria Population Commission (NPC) from the 2006 census. With annual growth of 2.5% as estimated by World Bank (2021), we used the future population estimation (FPE) formula to given as 'Future Population = Current Population × (1+Growth Rate)^{number of years} to get the population in 2024 thus; $23,488,500 \times (1+0.025)^2 = 23,488,500 \times (1.025)^2 = 23,488,500 \times 1.050625 = 24,694,797$. Therefore, the estimated population of Southeast Nigeria in 2024 is approximately 24,694,797. From this population we determine the sample size using the Cochran's formula which is widely used for determining sample size when the population is very large. The formula is given thus:

$$n_o = \frac{Z^2 \cdot p \cdot (1 - p)}{e^2}$$

Where n_o = Required sample size

Z = z-value (Z-score) corresponding to the desired confidence level

P= Estimated proportion of the attribute of interest in the population (we used 0.5 for maximum variability because the population is known).

e^2 = Margin of error (the maximum expected difference between the true population parameter and the sample estimate)

Substituting we have;

$$n_o = \frac{(3.8416) \cdot (0.5) \cdot (1 - 0.5)}{0.05^2}$$

Calculating we have;

$$n_o = \frac{1.96^2 \cdot (0.5) \cdot (0.5)}{0.0025}$$

$$n_o = \frac{0.9604}{0.0025} = 384.16 \text{ (round up to 385)}$$

Now, we will allocate the total sample size (385) to each state based on their population proportions. To do that we shall calculate the population of each state in 2024 with a 2% annual increase starting from 2022 in accordance with City Population (2024) projection drawn from 2006 Nigeria population census using the Exponential Growth Formula (EGF) also called the compound interest formula given as;

$$P = P_0 \times (1+r)^t$$

Where P = future population

P_0 = initial population (4,143,100 in 2022)

r = annual growth rate (as a decimal (0.025)

t = number of years into the future (2 years from 2022 to 2024) (2)

We shall start with Abia state which has 4,143,100 populations in 2022 according to City Population (2024).

Substituting

$$\text{We have } P = 4,143,100 \times (1+0.025)^2$$

$$\text{Calculating } P = 4,143,100 \times (1.025)^2$$

$$(1+0.025) = 1.025$$

$$(1.025)^2 = 1.050625$$

$$P = 4,143,100 \times 1.050625 = 4,356,947$$

Therefore, the estimated population of Abia State in 2024 is approximately 4,356,947 (City Population 2024). With the same method and formula, the five states in the region were calculated and the following outcome was recorded; Abia = 4,356,947, Anambra State = 6,272,730 Enugu State = 4,934,199., Ebonyi State = 3,414,314, and Imo State = 5,748,598 respectively. We did this with the stratified random sampling approach' to ensure representation across key demographic groups, such as age, gender, ethnicity, and socioeconomic status. This technique involves dividing the population into strata (subgroups/ states in this context) and randomly selecting participants from each stratum. This approach enhances the representativeness of the sample and allows for more nuanced analysis of differences between groups

Allocation of Sample Size to Each Stratum/State in the southeast region of Nigeria;

Total population of the study = 24,694,797

Sample Size Calculation for Each State

Abia = $385 \times \left(\frac{4,356,947}{24.6 \text{ million}}\right) = 68$, Anambra State = $385 \times \left(\frac{6,272,730}{24.6 \text{ million}}\right) = 98$, Enugu State = $385 \times \left(\frac{4,934,199}{24.6 \text{ million}}\right) = 77$, Ebonyi State = $385 \times \left(\frac{3,414,314}{24.6 \text{ million}}\right) = 53$, Imo State = $385 \times \left(\frac{5,748,598}{24.6 \text{ million}}\right) = 89$.

By employing this comprehensive research design and methods, the study aims to gather rich and valid data that will contribute significantly to understanding the intrinsic drivers of the IPOB conflict. We also employed mixed methods in the analysis. Some of the data collected especially from survey was presented in frequency tables. The responses from the study sample were expressed in percentage tables in relation to the number of respondents for this study. After that the relationship among variables under study are determined using the Karl Pearson's Product moment correlation coefficient, (the raw

score) formula presented thus;

$$\frac{N \sum XY - (\sum X)(\sum Y)}{\sqrt{n(\sum X^2) - (\sum X)^2} \sqrt{n(\sum Y^2) - (\sum Y)^2}}$$

to determine if a relationship exist among the variables. After that, the findings was also thoroughly examined by converting the r value to t score. In other words, we shall be employing the modified student's t test with the following formula;

$t = r \sqrt{\frac{n-2}{1-r^2}}$ in testing or examining the significance of the correlation coefficient.

On the qualitative aspect of the study, responses of the interviewees which were mostly ethnographic were sifted through with the aim of identifying the dominant themes in the responses to be use in the analysis. This is to avoid repetitions and monotonous analysis. Categorically, all the questionnaire items and the contents of the semi-structured interviews that were designed for this study exhibited a will consistent with pursuing the achievement of the research objectives as stated in the preliminary stage of this

Using the Cochran's formula, we determined a total sample size of 385, which was allocated proportionally across the states based on their population estimation in 2024. As presented in the table 4.1. This ensures that the sample for our study is representative of the population distribution in Southeast Nigeria within the period under study. However, as expected in a study of this magnitude the 385 questionnaires were sent to male and female, married and unmarried as well as divorced in the southeast zone. Stratified random sampling techniques were employed during the distribution of the instrument for data collection. The stratified sampling technique was used for the study because the population has different strata and then the simple random sampling was applied after the population has been divided into homogenous groups. Both techniques were drawn from the probability (random) sampling method. However, out of the 385 questionnaires that was sent out only 355 was returned, still from the 355 that was returned we rejected 5 because they were not properly completed. In other wards a total of 350 questionnaires were used for this study.

Table 1: Distribution of the Study Population and Sample size (Approx.)

Table of Allocated Sample Sizes		
State	Population (Approx.)	Allocated Sample Size
Abia	4.3 million	68
Anambra	6.3 million	98
Ebonyi	3.4 million	53
Enugu	4.9 million	77
Imo	5.7 million	89
Total	24.6 million	385

Source: Survey 2024

Analysis of Data

Analysis of the Questionnaire

Table 2: Sex Distribution of the Respondents

Gender	Respondents	% of Respondents By Sex
Male	130	62.86%
Female	220	37.14%
Total	350	100%

Source: Field Survey 2024.

The gender of the respondents from Southeastern Nigeria was studied in order to ascertain the pattern of distribution of the respondents according to their sex. From the analysis of table 2, out of 350 respondents, 220 representing 62.86% were females while 130 representing 37.14% were males. This implies that there were more female respondents in the region than males in the sample under study.

Table 3: Marital Status of Respondents

Options	Respondents	% of Respondents by Marital Status
Married	131	37.4%
Single	187	53.4%
Divorced	13	3.7%
Widowed	18	5.1%
Separated	2	0.6%
Total	350	100%

Source: Field Survey 2024.

From the table 3, 131 respondents out of the 350 sample representing 37.4% were married people while 187 people representing 53.4% of the sample were single, 13 people, representing 3.7% were divorced, 18 representing 5.1% were widowed and finally, 2 respondents representing 0.57% of the study sample were separated. This means that there are more single respondents in the study than the married ones, including

the divorced, the widowed and the separated put together. Perhaps, due to fear of family commitment under the region's precarious environment

Table 4: The Distribution of Respondents by Age

Options	Respondents	% of Respondents By Age
Less than 20 year	30	8.57%
21-30 years	142	40.57%
31- 40 years	71	20.29%
41- 50 years	60	17.14%
50 – 60 years	30	8.57%
60 years and above	17	4.86%
Total	350	100%

Source: Field Survey 2024

According the Table 4, out of the 350 respondents, 30 (8.57%) were less than 20 years, 142 (40.57%) were in the age group of 21-30 years, 71 (20.29%) were within the age 31-40 years, 60 (17.14%) were in the age bracket 41-50 years, 30 (8.57%) are in the age group of 51-60 years while 17 (4.86%) were above 60 year. This reveals that more of the respondents fall within the age bracket of 21-30 years in the southeast region.

Table 5: Educational Qualifications of Respondents

Options	Respondents	% of Respondents By Educational Qualification
FSLC	10	2.9 %
SSCE/NECO	61	17.4%
OND/NCE	68	19.4 %
B.Sc/HND	78	22.3%
MBA/M.Sc	40	11.4 %
P.h D	93	26.6 %
Total	350	100 %

Source: Field Survey 2024

The educational qualification of the respondents was studied in order to find their literacy level considering their contribution to the region. The result of the analysis as shown in table 5 reveals that 10 respondents representing 2.9% has FSLC, 61(17.4%) respondents had SSCE/NECO, 68 (19.4%) respondents had OND/NCE, 92 (26.3%) of the respondents were university undergraduates while, 78 (22.3%) were holders of B.Sc/HND. As indicated above the sample under study also has 40(11.4%) MBA/M.Sc degree holders with (26.56%) PhD. holders. This outcome demonstrates that the respondents had an appreciable level of education as about 34.0% of the sample had B.Sc/HND and above. This section analyzed the hypothesis drawn from the research questions bordering on the independent and dependent variables of the study topic. The decision criterion is to accept any higher percentage value % as the direction of such

respondent. The five points likert scale of strongly agreed (SA). Agreed (A), undecided (U), disagreed (D) and strongly disagreed (SD) is used with the weight averages of 5, 4, 3, 2 and 1 respectively as already indicated in methodology.

Test of Research Questions

Research Question 1

Table 6: Beliefs and Motivations Regarding Socio-Political Injustice and the IPOB Movement

S/n	Variables	SA (5)	A (4)	U (3)	D (2)	SD (1)
1	I believe historical narratives of socio-political injustice significantly influence my views on current events	115 (33%)	95 (27%)	80 (23%)	40 (11%)	20 (6%)
2	Historical injustices faced by my community have little to no impact on my identity	27 (8%)	38 (11%)	76 (22%)	99 (28%)	110 (31%)
3	I feel motivated to join the IPOB movement due to socio-political injustices	110 (31%)	75 (21%)	40 (11%)	100 (29%)	25 (7%)
4	Joining the IPOB is not necessary to achieve justice for my community	20 (6%)	40 (11%)	76 (22%)	98 (28%)	116 (33%)
5	I am not willing to make personal sacrifices to support the IPOB movement.	120 (34%)	90 (26%)	75 (21%)	30 (9%)	35 (10%)

Table 6 shows responses related to hypothesis one which states that ‘There is a positive relationship between the intrinsic belief in historical narratives of socio-political injustice and the motivation of South-eastern Nigeria to join the IPOB armed struggle’. For the question on whether historical narratives of socio-political injustice significantly influence people’s views on current events, 115 respondents (33%) strongly agreed, 95 respondents (27%) agreed, 80 respondents (23%) were undecided, 40 respondents (11%) disagreed while 20 respondents (6%) strongly disagreed. The highest percentage value exists in SA with 33% frequency, which means that the historical narratives of socio-political injustice significantly influence people’s views on current events in the region. Secondly, for the question on whether Historical injustices faced by communities in the region have little to no impact on their identity’ 27 respondents (8%) strongly agreed, 38 respondents (11%) agreed, 76 respondents (22%) were undecided, 99 respondents (28%) disagreed while 110 respondents (31%) strongly disagreed. The highest frequency in the situation is SD with 31% hence; Historical injustices faced by communities in the region have significant impact on their identity. In addition, on the question on whether they feel motivated to join the IPOB movement due to socio-political injustices, 110 respondents (31%) strongly agreed, 75 respondents (21%) agreed, 40 respondents (11%) were undecided 100 respondents (29%) disagreed while 25 respondents 7% strongly

disagreed. it means that they feel motivated to join the IPOB movement due to socio-political injustices’ with 31% frequency. Furthermore, on the question on whether ‘Joining the IPOB is not necessary to achieve justice for their community, 20 respondents (6%) strongly agreed, 40 respondents (11%) agreed, 76 respondents (22%) were undecided, 98 respondents (28%) disagreed while 116 respondents (33%) strongly disagreed. The SD has highest percentage frequency of 33% in other words; joining the IPOB movement is necessary to achieve justice for their community. Finally, on whether they are not willing to make personal sacrifices to support the IPOB movement. 120 respondents (34%) strongly agreed, 90 respondents (26%) agreed, 75 respondents (21%) undecided, while 30 respondents (9%) disagreed, while 35 respondents (10%) strongly disagreed. The highest percentage frequency was SA with 34% hence; they are not willing to make personal sacrifices to support the IPOB movement.

Research Question 2

Table 7: Security Presence and Psychological Factors Influencing IPOB Armed Resistance

S/n	Variables	SA (5)	A (4)	U (3)	D (2)	SD (1)
6	Increasing security presence in South-eastern Nigeria enhances the resolve of IPOB members to pursue armed resistance.	100 (29%)	95 (27%)	73 (21%)	25 (7%)	47 (13%)
7	A higher security presence in South-eastern Nigeria reduces the likelihood of armed resistance among IPOB members	47 (13%)	25 (7%)	70 (20%)	95 (27%)	103 (29%)
8	Intimidations from security forces in the region motivates IPOB members to engage in armed resistance	104 (30%)	94 (27%)	68 (19%)	26 (7%)	48 (13%)
9	Community support for the IPOB movement decreases with a higher security presence	73 (21%)	25 (7%)	47 (13%)	100 (29%)	95 (27%)
10	A sustained security presence in the region will likely escalate the motivation for IPOB members to engage in armed resistance.	110 (31%)	90 (26%)	80 (23%)	30 (9%)	40 (11%)

Table 7 above shows responses related to hypothesis two which states that ‘higher security presence in Southeastern Nigeria is negatively correlated with the psychological factors that drive IPOB members toward armed resistance’. From the responses on the questionnaires as presented above on whether ‘increasing security presence in South-eastern Nigeria enhances the resolve of IPOB members to pursue armed resistance’ 100 respondents (29%) strongly agreed, 95 respondents (27%) agreed, 73 respondents (21%) were undecided, 25 respondents (7%) disagreed, while 47 respondents (13%) strongly

disagreed. which means that SA has the most frequency with 29%,in other words, Increasing security presence in South-eastern Nigeria enhances the resolve of IPOB members to pursue armed resistance. furthermore, for the question on whether ‘higher security presence in South-eastern Nigeria reduces the likelihood of armed resistance among IPOB members’, 47 respondents (13%) strongly agreed, 25 respondents (7%) agreed, 70 respondents (20%) were undecided, 95 respondents (27%) disagreed, while 103 respondents (29%) strongly disagreed. This means that ‘higher security presence in South-eastern Nigeria does not reduce the likelihood of armed resistance among IPOB members’ since SD has 29% frequency. On whether ‘Intimidation from security forces in the region motivates IPOB members to engage in armed resistance’ 104 respondents (30%) strongly agreed, 94 respondents (27%) agreed, 68 respondents (19%) were undecided, 26 respondents (7%) disagreed, while 48 respondents (13%) strongly disagreed. With SA frequency on 30%, the response is that ‘Intimidation from security forces in the region motivates IPOB members to engage in armed resistance’. For the question on whether ‘community support for the IPOB movement decreases with a higher security presence’, 73 respondents (21%) strongly agreed, 25 respondents (7%) agreed, 47 respondents (13%) were undecided, 100 respondents (29%) disagreed, while 95 respondents (27%) strongly disagreed. The distribution of percentage response indicates that ‘community support for the IPOB movement does not decrease with a higher security presence in the region’, with 29% D and 27% SD respectively. Finally, on whether ‘sustained security presence in the region will likely escalate the motivation for IPOB members to engage in armed resistance’, 110 respondents (31%) strongly agreed, 90 respondents (26%) agreed, 80 respondents (23%) were undecided, 30 respondents (9%) disagreed, while 40 respondents (11%) strongly disagreed. In other words, ‘a sustained security presence in the region will likely escalate the motivation for IPOB members to engage in armed resistance’ with the 31% SA affirmative response frequency

Research Question 3

Table 8: Beliefs in self-determination and actions of IPOB in South-eastern Nigeria

S/n	Variables	SA (5)	A (4)	U (3)	D (2)	SD (1)
11	I strongly believe in the right to self-determination for the people of South-eastern Nigeria	115 (33%)	95 (27%)	80 (23%)	40 (11%)	20 (6%)
12	I do not feel motivated to support IPOB's actions based on beliefs in self-determination.	27 (8%)	38 (11%)	76 (22%)	99 (28%)	110 (31%)
13	A strong belief in self-determination will lead to increased support for IPOB's objectives in the long term.	110 (31%)	75 (21%)	40 (11%)	100 (29%)	25 (7%)
14	Self-determination beliefs create division rather than engagement within the community regarding IPOB ideas.	20 (6%)	40 (11%)	76 (22%)	98 (28%)	116 (33%)

15	The IPOB's ideology does not resonate with my views on self-determination.	35 (10%))	90 (26) %)	75 (21) %)	30 (9%)	120 (34%))
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Table 8 shows responses related to hypothesis one which states that ‘there is a significant correlation between beliefs in self-determination and the ideological framework and actions of IPOB in South-eastern Nigeria’. For the question on whether ‘they strongly believe in the right to self-determination for the people of South-eastern Nigeria’, 115 respondents (33%) strongly agreed, 95 respondents (27%) agreed, 80 respondents (23%) were undecided, 40 respondents (11%) disagreed while 20 respondents (6%) strongly disagreed. The highest percentage value exists in SA with 33% frequency, which means that ‘they strongly believe in the right to self-determination for the people of South-eastern Nigeria’. Secondly, for the question on whether ‘they do not feel motivated to support IPOB's actions based on beliefs in self-determination’, 27 respondents (8%) strongly agreed, 38 respondents (11%) agreed, 76 respondents (22%) were undecided, 99 respondents (28%) disagreed while 110 respondents (31%) strongly disagreed. The highest frequency in the situation is SD with 31% hence; ‘they feel motivated to support IPOB's actions based on beliefs in self-determination’. In addition, on the question on whether ‘a strong belief in self-determination will lead to increased support for IPOB's objectives in the long term’. strongly agreed, (SA) 110 respondents (31%) agreed, 75 respondents (21%) agreed, 40 respondents (11%) were undecided 100 respondents (29%) disagreed while 25 respondents 7% strongly disagreed. it means that a strong belief in self-determination will lead to increased support for IPOB's objectives in the long term’ with 31% frequency level’. Furthermore, on the question on whether ‘self-determination beliefs create division rather than engagement within the community regarding IPOB ideas’, 20 respondents (6%) strongly agreed, 40 respondents (11%) agreed, 76 respondents (22%) were undecided, 98 respondents (28%) disagreed while 116 respondents (33%) strongly disagreed. The SD has highest percentage frequency of 33% in other words; self-determination beliefs do not create division but engagement within the community regarding IPOB ideas. Finally, on whether ‘the IPOB's ideology does not resonate with their views on self-determination.,35 respondents (10%) strongly agreed, 90 respondents (26%) agreed, 75 respondents (21%) undecided, while 30 respondents (9%) disagreed, while 120 respondents (34%) strongly disagreed. The highest percentage frequency was SD with 34% hence; ‘the IPOB's ideology resonates with their views on self-determination.

Test of Hypothesis

At this point our three hypotheses formulated from the research questions shall be tested based on the responses from our population samples as formerly presented.

Hypothesis One

- H₀: There is a negative relationship between the intrinsic belief in historical narratives of socio-political injustice and the motivation of South-eastern Nigeria to join the IPOB armed struggle
- H₁: There is a positive relationship between the intrinsic belief in historical narratives of socio-political injustice and the motivation of South-eastern Nigeria to join the IPOB armed struggle.

The Karl Pearson's product moment correlation coefficient was employed to test the significant of the response from the questionnaires (respondents). Nevertheless, in the Karl Pearson's product moment correlation two statistical strategies or methods are available for the computation of r , they are;

- The use of mean and
- The raw score formula

To understand the approaches employed in this study very easily, we opted for the "raw score formula" during the computation of the data obtained for this study.

	X	Y	XY	X ²	Y ²
SA	120	115	13800	14400	13225
A	90	95	8550	8100	9025
U	75	80	6000	5625	6400
D	30	40	1200	900	1600
SD	35	20	700	1225	400
TOTAL	350	350	30250	30250	30650

With the Karl Pearson's product moment correlation formula (the Raw Score) which is given as:

$$r = \frac{N \sum XY - (\sum X)(\sum Y)}{\sqrt{n(\sum X^2) - (\sum X)^2} \sqrt{n(\sum Y^2) - (\sum Y)^2}}$$

we compute:

$$r = \frac{5 \times 30250 - (350)(350)}{5 \times 30250 - (350)^2 \sqrt{5 \times 30650 - (350)^2}}$$

$$r = \frac{151250 - 122500}{151250 - 122500 \sqrt{153250 - 122500}}$$

$$r = \frac{28750}{28750 \sqrt{30750}} \quad r = \frac{2875}{169.56 \times 175.36}$$

$$r = \frac{2875}{2973404} \quad r = 0.967$$

The above result shows almost a perfect correlation between the two variables under study, which indicates that, ‘there is a positive relationship between the intrinsic belief in historical narratives of socio-political injustice and the motivations of South-eastern Nigeria to join the IPOB armed struggle. At this point, we shall now examine the strength of the correlation by converting the *r* value which is 0.967 to *t* scores as expressed in the methodology. In this study the methods employed or used in testing the significance of the correlation coefficient is the modified student’s *t* test. With the formula below;

$$t = r \sqrt{\frac{n-2}{1-r^2}} \text{ we compute}$$

$$t = 0.967 \frac{\sqrt{5-2}}{1-(0.967)^2}$$

$$t = 0.967 \frac{\sqrt{3}}{1-0.935} \quad t = 0.967 \frac{\sqrt{3}}{0.065} \quad r = \sqrt{46.15}$$

$$t = 0.967 \times 6.79 \quad : t = 6.57$$

Where *n* is the number of observation *n-2* is the degree of freedom, *r* is the correlation coefficient while the value of *t* for 0.05 and 3 degree of freedom is 3.182.

Decision rule: The above tabulated value of 0.05 at 3 degree of freedom is 3.182, therefore the computed value is greater than the tabulated value ie. (6.57 > 3.82). We therefore reject the H₀ and accept the H₁ which states that, ‘there is a positive relationship between the intrinsic belief in historical narratives of socio-political injustice and the motivation of South-eastern Nigeria to join the IPOB armed struggle’. This finding resonates with most of the response of the interviewees when asked ‘if they can describe a specific historical event or narrative that has influenced their perception of socio-political injustice in Southeastern Nigeria’. And how does this event or narrative motivate their involvement with the Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB). Their response was consistently thus; "One significant historical event that has deeply influenced my perception of socio-political injustice is the Biafran War in the late 1960s. Growing up, I heard stories from my parents and grandparents about the suffering and loss during that time, which left a lasting impression on me. They often spoke about how the Igbo people were marginalized and faced discrimination, both then and in subsequent years¹. This narrative of oppression has motivated my involvement with IPOB because I feel a strong sense of responsibility to advocate for our rights and identity². The stories of injustice resonate with me; they remind me that many people in our community still feel unheard and neglected by the government. I believe that by supporting IPOB, I am standing up against these historical injustices and fighting for a better future for our people³. It’s not just about the past; it’s about ensuring that our voices are finally recognized and that we have a say in our own governance.

¹WPs 1-10, Oral Interview 20/12/2024

²WP 5, Oral Interview 20/12/2024

³WP 7, Oral Interview 20/12/2024

On the other hand, some asserted that one historical narrative that significantly impacts their views of socio-political injustice is the marginalization of the Igbo people following the Biafra War. I've read extensively about how the aftermath of the war led to economic hardships and systemic discrimination against our people. Many in my community feel that the government has consistently ignored our needs and grievances, perpetuating a cycle of inequality. This narrative drives my involvement with IPOB because it embodies our struggle for recognition and self-determination. I see IPOB as a platform that amplifies our voices and seeks to address these injustices.

Hypothesis Two

- H₀: A higher security presence in Southeastern Nigeria is negatively correlated with the psychological factors that drive IPOB members toward armed resistance
- H₁: A higher security presence in Southeastern Nigeria is positively correlated with the psychological factors that drive IPOB members toward armed resistance

	X	Y	XY	X ²	Y ²
SD	110	102	11220	12100	10,404
A	90	97	8730	8100	9409
U	80	75	6000	6400	5625
D	30	27	810	900	729
SD	40	49	1960	1600	2401
TOTAL	350	350	28720	29100	28568

$$r = \frac{N \sum XY - (\sum X)(\sum Y)}{\sqrt{n(\sum X^2) - (\sum X)^2} \sqrt{n(\sum Y^2) - (\sum Y)^2}} \quad r = 0.975$$

Again the above result depicted almost a perfect correlation between the variables under study indicating that “a higher security presence in Southeastern Nigeria is positively correlated with the psychological factors that drive IPOB members toward armed resistance”. Just like before, we shall now examine the strength of the positive correlation by converting the *r* value which is 0.975 to *t* test. In this study as already emphasized, the method employed or used in testing the significant of the correlation coefficient is the modified student *t* test.

Using the formula below;

$$t = r \sqrt{\frac{n-2}{1-r^2}} \quad t = 8.90$$

Where *n* is the number of observations *n*-2 is the degree of freedom. *r* is the correlation coefficient and the critical value of *t* for *a*=0.05 and 3 degree of freedom is 3.182.

Decision Rules; The tabulated value of 0.05 at 3 degree of freedom is 3.182, hence, the computed value, e.g. (8.90>3.182), we therefore, reject the H₀ and accept the H₁ which argued that ‘a higher security presence in Southeastern Nigeria is positively correlated with the psychological factors that drive IPOB members toward armed resistance.

Again the findings of Hypothesis two is consistent with the response from the semi-structured interviews. For instance when asked how they perceive the presence of security forces in Southeastern Nigeria, and in what ways they think it influences their feelings about the IPOB movement and the idea of armed resistance. Virtually all the respondents feel the same way. They respond that the presence of security forces in Southeastern Nigeria makes them feel conflicted⁴. On one hand, I understand that they are there to maintain order, but on the other hand, their heavy presence often feels oppressive⁵. Their high presence in the region creates an atmosphere of fear and tension in our communities. When I see soldiers or police on the streets, it reminds me of the injustices we've faced, and it heightens my sense of vulnerability.

Some insists that such heightened security environment can push people me toward the idea of armed resistance as It feels like a response to the constant surveillance and intimidation we experience⁶. We often view the security forces as part of the system that marginalizes us, so it can make the notion of taking up arms seem like a viable option to defend our rights and identity they argued. They insist that the more they feel cornered and threatened, the stronger the desire becomes to fight back. It's a complex situation where fear and frustration can amplify the drive for resistance⁷.

Hypothesis Three

H0: There is no significant correlation between beliefs in self-determination and the ideological framework and actions of IPOB in South-eastern Nigeria

H1: There is a significant correlation between beliefs in self-determination and the ideological framework and actions of IPOB in South-eastern Nigeria

	X	Y	XY	X ²	Y ²
SA	120	115	13800	14400	13225
A	90	95	8550	8100	9025
U	75	80	6000	5625	6400
D	30	40	1200	900	1600
SD	35	20	700	1225	400
TOTAL	350	350	30250	30250	30650

$$r = \frac{N \sum XY - (\sum X)(\sum Y)}{\sqrt{n(\sum X^2) - (\sum X)^2} \sqrt{n(\sum Y^2) - (\sum Y)^2}} \quad r = 0.967$$

The above result for the third time has again demonstrated almost a perfect correlation between the two variables under study, which indicates that, 'There is a significant correlation between beliefs in self-determination and the ideological framework and actions of IPOB in South-eastern Nigeria'. As we have been highlighting, we shall now examine the strength of the correlation by converting the **r** value which is 0.967 to **t**

⁴WPs 1-12, Oral Interview 16/01/2025

⁵WPs 1-9, Oral Interview 16/01/2025

⁶WPs 1-5, Oral Interview 17/01/2025

⁷WPs 9, Oral Interview 16/01/2025

scores. In this study the methods employed or used in testing the significance of the correlation coefficient is the modified student's *t* test. Using the formula below;

$$t = r \sqrt{\frac{n-2}{1-r^2}} \quad t = 6.57$$

Where *n* is the number of observation *n-2* is the degree of freedom, *r* is the correlation coefficient while the value of *t* for 0.05 and 3 degree of freedom is 3.182.

Decision rule: The above tabulated value of 0.05 at 3 degree of freedom is 3.182, therefore the computed value is greater than the tabulated value i.e. (6.57 > 3.82). We therefore reject the H₀ There is no significant correlation between beliefs in self-determination and the ideological framework and actions of IPOB in South-eastern Nigeria' and accept the H₁ There is a significant correlation between beliefs in self-determination and the ideological framework and actions of IPOB in South-eastern Nigeria. This outcome is also consistent with the responses from our semi-structured interviews. For instance, when asked "how their beliefs in self-determination influence their understanding of the IPOB's ideology and its actions in Southeastern Nigeria?" they all echoed; "my beliefs in self-determination are deeply intertwined with how I view IPOB's ideology and actions"⁸. I've always felt that the Igbo people deserve the right to govern themselves and make decisions that reflect their values and needs. This belief is rooted in our history of marginalization and the struggles we've faced as a community⁹. IPOB embodies this desire for self-determination. Their call for independence resonates with many of us who feel overlooked by the Nigerian government¹⁰. When I see IPOB mobilizing people for protests or advocating for our rights, I see it as a manifestation of our collective aspiration for autonomy. It's not just about political independence; it's about restoring our dignity and identity¹¹. Moreover, their actions often reflect the urgency we feel regarding our place in Nigeria. The frustrations we experience on a daily basis-economic neglect and political disenfranchisement-fuel our support for IPOB. For many, this movement is a way to channel our anger and hope into something tangible. It's a fight for our future, and I believe that without self-determination, we risk losing our cultural identity and the ability to shape our destiny."¹² Additionally, the more I learn about the systemic injustices we face, the more I appreciate IPOB's role in advocating for our rights. Their efforts to raise awareness about our struggles help galvanize support within the community and beyond. In my view, their actions are not just about seeking independence; they reflect a broader struggle for dignity and equality. This connection between self-determination and IPOB's mission is what motivates me to support their cause."

Conclusion

The above analysis offers significant insights into the complex socio-political dynamics that characterize the IPOB movement in Southeastern Nigeria. By examining three

⁸WPs 1-12, Oral Interview 18/01/2025

⁹WP6, Oral Interview 18/01/2025

¹⁰WP8, Oral Interview 18/01/2025

¹¹WP10, Oral Interview 19/01/2025

¹²WP4, Oral Interview 20/01/2025

distinct hypotheses, the study elucidates the fundamental factors motivating individuals to engage in armed resistance. The findings reveal that intrinsic beliefs in historical narratives of socio-political injustice play a critical role in shaping motivations to join the IPOB struggle. This underscores the importance of historical context in understanding contemporary movements, as individuals who resonate with narratives of injustice are more likely to seek redress through active participation in such groups. Moreover, the analysis highlights the unintended consequences of heightened security measures in the region. Instead of deterring resistance, increased security presence may amplify psychological motivations for armed struggle, suggesting that policies aimed at maintaining order must consider the psychological impact on marginalized populations. This finding calls for a re-evaluation of traditional security strategies, advocating for approaches that prioritize dialogue and understanding over coercion. Finally, the correlation between beliefs in self-determination and the ideological framework of IPOB emphasizes the necessity for recognizing and addressing the aspirations of marginalized groups. The quest for self-determination is a powerful motivator that can drive collective action, and ignoring these aspirations may lead to further unrest.

Overall, the study contributes to a broader understanding of the interplay between historical narratives, security dynamics, and ideological motivations in shaping resistance movements. Policymakers must adopt a more nuanced approach that acknowledges these factors, fostering an environment conducive to dialogue and reconciliation. By addressing the root causes of discontent, stakeholders can work toward sustainable solutions that promote peace and stability in Southeastern Nigeria, ultimately benefiting the region as a whole.

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