The Implications of Neuroscience on Mens Rea in the Determination of Criminal Responsibility in Nigeria: The Freewill and Deterministic Perspectives

Abstract

A key principle of our criminal law jurisprudence and practice, especially as it relates to criminal responsibility is the principle of mens rea. The principle is to the effect that a person will generally not be guilty of any crime if the act in breach of the law occurs independently of his or her will or if it occurs by accident. Our system of criminal justice is based primarily on the ideas of freewill and responsibility for conduct, according to which it is fair and just that offenders should be punished to an extent that is proportionate to their guilt. However recent developments in the area of Neuroscience seem to contradict that notion. The determinists posit that events, including human actions, are ultimately determined by causes external to the will. Some philosophers even take determinism to imply that individual human beings have no will and cannot be held morally responsible for their actions. They contend that individual action is to some extent caused by factors outside of an individual’s control. If the above ideology is upheld, it has serious implications for the concept of mens rea in the determination of criminal responsibility. It is against the foregoing background that this work examines the practical implication of this recent development in Neuroscience on the concept of criminal responsibility especially as it relates to the deterministic and freewill perspectives. The work found that if free will is disregarded, it would be nearly impossible to punish anybody for any offence. It is recommended that as further progress is made in the area of neuroscience that our laws will be amended so as to meet up with the exigencies of time.