A Critical Appraisal of the Criminal Responsibility of the Insane Person Under the Nigeria Legal Jurisprudence

Abstract

Since the acquittal of Daniel M’Naughten, the paranoid wood turner from Glasglow by reason of
insanity in 1843, insanity or mental illness remained one of the excusing conditions for crime. The
issue of non-responsibility for crime because of insanity has resulted in a series of controversial
judicial decisions. This paper x-rays the fate of the insane person under the Nigerian criminal
system. It presents the origin of the concept of non-responsibility of the insane person because of
insanity. The paper asserts that the insanity defence in Nigeria is governed by the common law
conception outlined by the provisions of the M’Naughten Rules sequel to the acquittal of
M’Naughten by reason of insanity in 1843. Statutory provisions and judicial decisions are also
presented. The discourse also asserts that in assessing the criminal responsibility of the insane
person, the burden of proof shifts from the prosecution to the defence. The paper concludes that,
presently, the position in Nigeria is that if it is established that the accused person was insane at
the time the alleged crime was committed, he or she will not be held criminally liable. But if found
insane at the time of trial, the accused will be committed to an asylum or a mental health hospital
or facility until he or she is deemed fit to stand trial.